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Abstract 
 We examine self-enforcing honesty in firm-investor relations in an imperfect 
public information game.  Minimum firm size requirements and moral hazard limit 
ability to raise outside capital, yielding a floor on personal wealth required to enter 
entrepreneurship.  Credible auditing could create efficiency gains. We propose mandatory 
disclosure of audit fees and an interpretation of international differences in shareholding 
patterns.  We endogenize auditor-firm collusion and extortion by auditors.  We embed 
our game-theoretic analysis in a general equilibrium model to generate unique equilibria 
that trace the impact of the distribution of wealth on the existence of the market and 
consequences for development.   
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HONESTY AND INTERMEDIATION:  CORPORATE CHEATING, AUDITOR 
INVOLVEMENT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT 
1.  Introduction 
 
Recent corporate scandals have often featured firms cheating their shareholders, 
with or without auditor involvement.  This environment raises issues of trust in firm-
investor relations and of “self-enforcing honesty”.   In particular, low  shareholder trust 
obviously has adverse economy-wide repercussions.  Once one expects to be dealt with 
dishonestly, this distrust discourages investors, leading to a collapse of industry and 
triggering off a recession.  Honesty and trust, on the other hand, feed off each other.  
Focusing on the moral hazards faced by firm insiders, we ask when firm insiders will 
behave honestly and characterize possible equilibria in a world with stochastic market 
outcomes and imperfect information.   We also investigate when efficiency can be 
improved – through market creation or increased output and welfare - by employing 
informed intermediaries (like auditors) and when the presence of such intermediaries 
could lead to honest equilibria (taking into account the auditor’s possible temptations to 
collude with clients planning fraud or to extort blackmail from honest ones).   We also 
discuss some policy applications of our model and predictions relating to disclosure of 
audit contracts,  public transparency and the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms.  We briefly discuss 
possible extensions of our work including suggestions on international differences in 
shareholding patterns. 
The distinction between entrepreneurs who control firms and ordinary investors 
who do not, reflects the distribution of wealth in a society.  Our exploration of this link 
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leads us into the realm of development economics.  We show that  the level and 
distribution of wealth affect the growth of corporations and indeed the very existence of 
the share market through an angle hitherto unnoticed in the development literature – that of 
credibility.  This has obvious implications for the processes of industrialization and 
growth. 
While our basic tool is the infinite-horizon one-sided prisoner’s dilemma game, we 
embed this within a general equilibrium framework.  This enables us to establish the 
existence of a unique equilibrium for any given set of parameters.  It also makes it possible 
for us to endogenize the set of firms that participate actively in the game and the set of 
investors.  
2.  Assumptions. 
We assume that all individuals are immortal and belong to a closed community 
with a given wealth distribution.  Their wealth is inelastic and fixed in supply, there is no 
saving or depreciation.  Further, they cannot borrow.  However, they can lend (to the 
outside world or to government) at a fixed rate of return R.  All agents are risk-neutral. 
Individuals can become entrepreneurs and set up firms.  However, any enterprise 
requires a minimum investment of I.  Entrepreneurs have no access to any external source 
of funds other than investors.  Problems of collective action and contract enforcement are 
sufficient to prevent them forming partnerships among themselves.  Groups that can solve 
these problems effectively (such as the extended business families of pre-war Japan, 
contemporary Korea, India and the Chinese Diaspora) can be viewed as collective entities 
with a combined wealth that is the relevant factor in this case.  Individuals – or groups of 
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this kind – with personal funds F < I must therefore go public in order to engage in any 
enterprise. 
Each enterprise lasts for one period after which investors can retrieve their capital 
in its original form.  A fresh enterprise requires refinancing by investors. 
Firms experience good luck and earn a rate of profit of G on total capital with 
probability p, and bad luck with a rate of profit of B otherwise (G > B). H = pG + (1 – p)B 
> R is the firm’s profit expectation on total capital.  G and B are exogenous. One may, for 
example, assume that output is subject to exogenous shocks while prices are fixed in the 
world market as in a small open economy.   
Investors and firms have an understanding that all shareholders should receive an 
expected return of D (“dividend”) on their capital.  The entrepreneur in addition should 
receive an “autonomous” expected payment of A, not linked to the volume of insider 
capital.  Both D and A are determined endogenously. For the bulk of this paper we shall 
assume that these expectations are to be achieved by paying outside investors 
(“shareholders” who contribute a total of S to the firm’s capital) an amount DSG/H when 
luck is good and DSB/H when it is bad.  The firm is to retain (A + DF)G/H and (A + 
DF)B/H under good and bad luck respectively.  The outside investor’s expected income 
then works out at 
pDSG/H + (1 – p)DSB/H = DS[pG/H + (1 – p)B/H] = DS  
while the insider’s income expectations add up similarly to A + DF.  These income 
expectations sum to A + D(F + S) which is equal to the total profits of the enterprise H(F + 
S), implying A = (H – D)(F + S).  In essence, we confine ourselves to a pure equity 
contract for most of the analysis that follows.  
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 However, we shall later consider other contracts that promise the same return to the 
investor and endogenize the firm’s choice between these alternatives. 
 We assume that DB/H < R, so that investors prefer not to enter the industry if they 
expect to receive only their bad luck dues.  A sufficient condition for this to hold for all 
non-negative D and positive R is that B should be non-positive. 
The parameters F, S, G, B and p are common knowledge.  But the actual realization 
of the firm is not observable by outsiders or legally verifiable.  Therefore, the 
understanding is not a fully enforceable contract.  The firm can cheat by distributing 
DSB/H to its outside investors even when luck is good. 
There is a publicly observable signal that detects cheating by investors with an 
accuracy (probability) of q with a one period lag and there is collective memory of past 
cheating. 
We retain all these assumptions throughout the subsequent analysis.  However, we 
do have two separate models of the firm, each with its own distinctive characteristics. In 
the first model, we assume that the firm derives its identity from the investment of its own 
capital F in firm-specific assets (a la Oliver Williamson) that are valueless outside the firm; 
and that outside investors have a contractually guaranteed priority of claim in the event of 
liquidation of the firm.  The latter is enforceable because the assets of a firm that has shut 
shop are verifiable and its payouts are common knowledge. In the second model, we 
withdraw these assumptions. 
Of our assumptions, the one that needs further discussion is that of no savings.  We 
assume zero savings so as to focus on the distinctive consequences of cheating without our 
 5
results being obscured by the changing dynamics of the accumulation and distribution of 
wealth.  A justification for the assumption is provided in the Appendix. 
3.  The Model with Firm-specific Assets 
Cheating offers the firm an instant gain of  
G(F + S) – (A + DF)G/H – DSB/H 
= (G – B)DS/H. 
But it also involves the risk of detection by the public signal.  Exposure of a firm as a cheat 
triggers instant collective withdrawal of all investment. Thus, detection implies closure of 
the firm and loss of its capital as well as of its future stream of profits from honest 
operation.  Cheating therefore is deterred if 
(1)                                                 ( ) { }[ ]
(1 )
G B DS A DFq
H
δ δ
− +≤
−
.                                         
Substituting for A from the relationship A = (H – D)(F + S) and rearranging, 
(2)                                            (1 ) ( )
[( ) ]
DS G Bq
H F S H DS
δ
δ
− −≥
+ −
 = q*(D).                                  
The firm will have no incentive to cheat if the probability of detection exceeds the ratio of 
cheating gains to the present value of future profits lost in the event of detection. 
Alternatively, we can derive a ceiling for D:  
(3)                                                          
2 ( )
(1 )
q H F SD
q HS LS
δ
δ δ
+≤
+ −
 .                                      
Here L = G-B. 
Writing s for S/F, (3) translates into  
(4)                                             
2
2[ { (1 )} ]
q Hs
D q H L q H
δ
δ δ δ≤ + − −  = s*.                                 
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(3) or equivalently, (4) represents a credibility constraint.  The insider knows that, if s 
exceeds the limit set by (4), investors will expect him to cheat and will not therefore invest. 
(3) and (4) are subject to the insider’s participation constraint A ≥ 0 – without which the 
insider would prefer to invest his capital in other firms rather than go into business himself 
since his income as an outside investor would exceed his income as an insider.  A ≥ 0 
implies 
(5)                                                                      H ≥ D.                                                         
However, as long as D < H, the insider’s expected gains will rise with outside investment:  
so profit maximization will drive s up to the limits of credibility, turning the inequality (4) 
into an equation indicating the insider’s demand for outside capital.  In the space (s, D), (4) 
determines a function s*(D) that can be represented by a rectangular hyperbola asymptotic 
to the vertical D-axis and to the horizontal 
2
(1 )
q HD
q H L
δ
δ δ= + − .  Intuitively, the moral 
hazard of the insider (his temptation to cheat) is an increasing function of D (the rate of 
return expected by outside investors) as well as of s (the ratio of outsider to insider capital).  
Any increase in D must therefore be offset by a decrease in s if the firm is to be deterred 
from cheating.     
D (or s) also determines the minimum wealth that an entrepreneur needs to enter 
the field.  Since the firm needs to reach a minimum size I to be functional, it cannot come 
into being unless 
(6)                                                                         I-F s*
F
≤ .                                           
This implies 
 7
(7)                                                                        F ≥ I
1+s*
 = F*.                                       
F* is the minimum wealth requirement for entry and depends on the level of s (or D). 
 Now suppose K is the aggregate wealth of the economy and P(W) the fraction of 
total wealth owned by those with wealth below W.  Then the total demand for outside 
capital generated by the entrepreneurs who can enter is 
(8)                                                            Xd =  K[1 – P{
I
1+s*(D)
}]s*(D)                               
Here, the term in square brackets represents the ratio of entrepreneurial capital to the total 
wealth of the economy.  The RHS, therefore, represents the amount of outside capital that 
entrepreneurs can apply for without compromising their credibility.  As D falls, not only 
can each firm credibly apply for more outside investment, but also more firms can enter 
and create additional demand for capital. 
The total supply of outside capital is the total wealth of those below the minimum 
threshold required for entry: 
(9)                                                                     Xs = KP[
I
1+s*(D)
].                                   
This is subject to the outside investor’s participation constraint  D ≥ R that assures 
investors of their opportunity                                                                                   
With the supply and demand functions for outsider capital thus defined, three kinds 
of equilibrium are possible: 
First, (Case 1) a regular interior equilibrium with H > D > R (Fig. 2) characterized by 
(10)        
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IP( )
1+s*(D)s*(D) = I1 ( )
1+s*(D)
P−
.         
A striking characteristic of this is that, for given I, the equilibrium value of s* is 
uniquely determined by the distribution of wealth alone.  If we write P as a function of s*, 
P = Q(s*), equation (10) reduces to 
(10a)                                                s* = Q(s*)/{1 – Q(s*)},                                            
which has a unique solution.  In this equilibrium, outside capital is fully employed without 
being in excess demand.  The optimal ratio of outsider to entrepreneurial capital exactly 
corresponds to the ratio of wealth owned by those below the minimum wealth requirement 
for entry to that owned by those above.   The interior equilibrium occurs for parameter 
ranges such that  
*( )[1 ( )] ( )
1 *( ) 1 *( )
I Is H P P
s H s H
− <
+ +
, 
and 
( ) *( )[1 ( )]
1 *( ) 1 *( )
I IP s R P
s R s R
< −
+ +
. 
Second, (Case 2) an equilibrium in which D = H, the participation constraint of the 
firm is binding and capitalists are indifferent between setting up their own businesses and 
investing in others (Fig. 3).  This equilibrium occurs for parameters such that 
*( )[1 ( )] ( )
1 *( ) 1 *( )
I Is H P P
s H s H
− >
+ +
. 
Third, (Case 3) an equilibrium in which D = R, the participation constraint of the 
investor binds and investors are indifferent between investing in the firm and in their 
 9
outside option1 (Fig. 4).  Here there is an excess supply of capital which has taken shelter 
in its outside option.  This equilibrium occurs for parameter ranges such that 
( ) *( )[1 ( )]
1 *( ) 1 *( )
I IP s R P
s R s R
> −
+ +
. 
There also remains a possibility (Case 4) that no market may exist.  If Wmax is the 
wealth of wealthiest individual, P(Wmax) = 1.  Suppose that s*(Dmin) = (I/ Wmax) – 1.  Then 
for all D ≥ Dmin , Xd = 0.  The demand curve lies in the positive quadrant only for D < Dmin.  
Now, if Dmin < R, the minimum supply price of outside capital, the demand and supply 
curves will not intersect.  No equilibrium will be possible (Fig. 5).  Note that a low Wmax 
implies a higher s*( Dmin), and therefore a low Dmin.  Thus if the society is a poor one 
without any rich individuals, a market is not likely to exist. 
To sum up, without auditing, and when insiders’ assets are firm-specific, only those 
with wealth above a certain floor can become entrepreneurs. Moreover, a market may not 
exist if no one in the society has wealth above a particular floor.  However, if a market 
exists, there can be three different types of equilibria depending on the distribution of 
wealth.  Only one of these is an interior equilibrium (with insiders earning strictly more 
than outsiders, who in turn have invested all their wealth in the enterprise and earn strictly 
more than the outside opportunity R).  In the second equilibrium, insiders are just 
indifferent between becoming an entrepreneur and becoming an outside shareholder in 
another firm : while in the third, outsiders are indifferent between financing the enterprise 
and the outside opportunity – but some outsider capital is necessarily not invested in the 
enterprise. 
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4.The Model with Redeployable Assets 
 In this case, firms that are exposed as cheats and dissolved due to loss of investor 
confidence do not lose their capital.  They can in fact withdraw their capital without cost 
and reinvent themselves as outside investors in other firms.  Now the other option firms 
have is simply to get the outside opportunity cost on their funds.  They will take whichever 
option gives them more.   
Cheating will be deterred only if 
(11)                                      ( ) { max{ , } }
(1 )
G B DS q A DF D R F
H
δ
δ
− + −≤
−
.                                
Assume first that D > R.  This implies 
(1 )LDSA
q H
δ
δ
−≥ . 
Substituting for A in terms of D, one derives the inequality 
(12)                                           
2 ( )
( ) (1 )
H F S qD
F S q H LS
δ
δ δ
+≤
+ + −
 =D**.                               
Alternatively, we can express this as a ceiling on s: 
(13)                                        ( )
[ (1 )} ( )]
q H H Ds
DL q H H D
δ
δ δ
−≤
− − −
 =s**(D),                        
or as a lower limit to q: 
(14)                                             (1 )
( )(1 )
s LDq
H H D s
δ
δ
−≥
− +
 = q**(D).                                  
As in the model with firm-specific assets, the profit maximizing firm will expand up to the 
limit represented by (13), converting this inequality into an equation.  s**(D) can then be 
represented in the positive quadrant of the (s, D) space by a curve that intercepts the 
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vertical D-axis at D = H and declines monotonically to a horizontal asymptote at 
2
(1 )
q HD
q H L
δ
δ δ= + − . 
 If however this asymptote is less than R, we must redo our calculations from the 
point at which the s**(D) curve dips below D = R.  Assuming D < R, inequality (11) now 
yields  
[( ) ]
(1 )
q H F S H RFD
q HS LS
δ
δ δ
+ −≤
+ −
≤ R 
Or (1 )
( )( )
RLSq
H H R F S
δ
δ
−
<
− +
 
Or ( )
[ (1 )} ( )]
q H H Rs
RL q H H R
δ
δ δ
−≤
− − −
=s**. 
These limits are independent of D, and therefore constant at the values reached by inserting 
D = R in (13) and (14). 
 As in the model with firm-specific assets, all this imposes a minimum wealth 
requirement for entry and, in interaction with the distribution of wealth in the economy, 
generates a demand curve for, and a supply curve of, outside capital. The demand curve 
Xd(D) differs from that in the previous model in that it (1) intercepts the vertical axis at D 
= H instead of having a horizontal segment at this level, and (2) becomes vertical below D 
= R (Fig. 6). In consequence of the first property, one of the three kinds of possible 
equilibria for the previous model disappears in this:  there cannot be an equilibrium in 
which the firm’s participation constraint binds – D cannot equal H.  The second property 
does not however imply any further restriction on the varieties of possible equilibria.  The 
case where no equilibrium exists in the previous model may also be replicated in this.  
 12
Here in fact if s**(R) implies a minimum entry requirement in excess of Wmax, no demand 
curve for outside capital will exist at all. 
 To sum up, without auditing, and when insiders’ assets are redeployable, there is 
again a certain floor on the wealth needed to become an entrepreneur. Again, a market may 
not exist if no one in the society has wealth above a particular floor.  If a market exists, 
there can be two different types of equilibria depending on the distribution of wealth.  One 
of these is an interior equilibrium (with insiders earning strictly more than outsiders, who 
in turn have invested all their wealth in the enterprise and earn strictly more than the 
outside opportunity R).   In the other, outsiders are indifferent between financing the 
enterprise and the outside opportunity but some outsider capital is necessarily not invested 
in industry. 
5.  Inequality, the Share Market and Development 
Our model sheds some light on a major barrier to industrialization in many poor 
countries.  In such countries, even when enough aggregate wealth exists to support large-
scale industry, its mobilization and concentration is often impossible if it is spread too 
widely.  If not too many individuals are wealthy enough to set up businesses on their own, 
others may find it difficult to raise supplementary funds to do the same.  The constraints on 
borrowing are well-known and have been extensively studied.  We show that raising 
capital from the share market runs into a similar credibility constraint, a limit on the ratio 
of outsider to insider capital set by concerns over cheating.  This accounts in part for the 
relative underdevelopment of share markets in most poor countries2.  It explains why most 
firms in such countries are set up by extended family groups (the Zaibatsu of nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Japan, the Korean chaebol and the family firms of India and of 
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the Chinese business sphere) within which capital can flow freely because of a degree of 
trust and reciprocity among the members.  It also accounts for the efforts of governments 
like the Korean to deliberately foster inequality so as to facilitate the accumulation of 
personal fortunes that could help in building up credible large-scale industries3. 
 If, however, a market exists, and particularly if we have an interior equilibrium of 
the kind depicted in Fig. 2, the role of wealth inequality changes.  Here, the equilibrium 
ratio of outsider to insider capital s* is, for any given I, uniquely determined by the 
distribution of wealth;  and it can be shown that the more egalitarian the distribution of a 
given aggregate wealth (in the sense of a higher P( ) for any W), the higher must s* be in 
equilibrium:  the demand curve for outside capital Xd(D) will lie further to the left,  the 
supply curve Xs(D) further to the right, so that D will be lower – not surprisingly, given the 
negative relationship between D and s* and the higher equilibrium value of s*.  Indeed, as 
the distribution of wealth becomes more equitable, the equilibrium level of D may fall to R 
(as in Fig. 4);  increase in equity beyond this point leads to the disappearance of the 
market. 
 This view of equity as an inhibitor of industrialization contrasts starkly with the 
received wisdom articulated, for example, by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny [1989].  They 
see equity as laying the foundations of industrialization by creating a large homogeneous 
mass market for manufactures.  This, however, is essentially a demand effect.  It affects 
production only in a closed economy, where the consumption and production patterns must 
coincide.  In a small open economy, the two are independent. 
 A wealthier economy with the same degree of inequality – i. e. with higher 
aggregate wealth but the same Lorenz curve – would have the opposite characteristics.  
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The fraction of total wealth P(W) owned by people with less than a given level W of 
personal wealth will be smaller;  given I, the minimum investment requirement for each 
firm, outsider capital requirements will be lower in equilibrium, thus permitting   a higher 
expected income D for outside investors.  It becomes easier to sustain a credible capital 
market – an addition to the long list of factors that tend to make industrialization a 
cumulative process and create vicious circles that retard the development of poorer 
economies. 
 Finally, an increase in minimum firm-size requirements I with the same level and 
distribution of wealth will increase P for any given s*, thereby depressing the demand 
curve for outside capital and driving up the supply curve, reducing D and increasing s* in 
equilibrium.  Thus, technological indivisibilities make it more likely that markets would 
collapse. 
6.  The Role of the Auditor 
 The induction of an auditor who can detect and expose cheating by firms changes 
the picture.  It opens the door to Pareto improvements in equilibrium.  It accomplishes this 
essentially by relaxing the credibility constraint. s*(D) or s**(D) increase for any level of 
D.   Firms can mobilize more outside capital for a given rate of payout.  Also, the 
minimum wealth level required for entry falls, so that more entrepreneurs enter.  The 
demand curve for outside capital shifts upward;  so does the supply curve (since more 
entrepreneurs means fewer outside investors) – though their intercepts on the D-axis do not 
shift.  We prove this below and then discuss the consequences for the different kinds of 
equilibrium specified above. 
 15
Let V denote the fee to be paid each period to a firm-hired auditor.  Auditors are 
paid at the beginning of each period.  If the investors receive low returns, the auditor 
investigates and then delivers an audit report revealing whether the firm cheated or has just 
been unlucky.  At this stage, the firm and the auditor can bargain with each other, the firm 
offering a bribe in exchange for a favorable report, the auditor demanding extra payment 
for such a report. We discuss below the feasible strategies open to each of the actors in this 
scenario. 
   First, firms may or may not engage auditors at time t = 0, paying an agreed fee.  In 
either event, they may or may not cheat.  If they have hired an auditor and cheated, they 
may or may not choose to bribe him by offering an extra payment coincidentally with the 
delivery of a favourable audit report.  They could make the offer right at the outset of the 
period (say at the time of hiring) or later after the cheating and perhaps the investigation 
has occurred. If they have hired an auditor and not cheated, and the auditor demands an 
extra payment for certifying to the fact, they may pay or not pay. 
Second, the auditor accepts a fee at t = 0 and investigates whether cheating has 
occurred.  If it has, he could truthfully report the fact or suppress it for a bribe.  If it has 
not, he could truthfully report this without additional demands or demand a payment for 
such a report.  He also however has the option of negotiating at the outset of the period 
with the firm, offering it a clean report card in exchange for a bribe, both to be delivered at 
the end of the period. 
Third, investors observe at t = 0 whether firms have hired auditors or not.  
Depending on the information regime assumed, they may or may not get to know the 
auditor’s fees.  They then decide whether to invest in a firm or not.  At t = 1, they may or 
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may not reinvest.  The information available to them at this point includes the return they 
have received in the last period, the ratio of insider to outsider capital, the auditor’s report 
and the public signal. 
We now show that with auditing, and when insider assets are redeployable, there 
exists an equilibrium where (a) all firms become clients of the auditor and act honestly,  (b) 
the auditor does not collude with firms planning to cheat, nor does he extort by threatening 
to blacklist honest firms, (c) investors know this and finance the industry, (d) the investors’ 
off-equilibrium strategy is to shun any firm which is not the auditor’s client, to stop 
financing any firm the auditor labels a cheat, and to mistrust the auditor if and only if he is 
revealed by the public signal to be colluding with or blackmailing a client.  Moreover, if 
audit fees lie in a certain range, and this is disclosed to investors, the honest equilibrium is 
guaranteed. 
For given D, credible auditing (1) increases the limit on s below which investors 
will be able to finance the industry without fear of being cheated and (2) lowers the floor 
on wealth required to become an entrepreneur – even if we account for the auditor’s 
propensities to collude and extort if he has more than one client. 
Proof:   Hiring an auditor and staying honest thereafter is more attractive for firms 
than not becoming a client if and only if 
(15)                                            A + {D – max (D, R)}F – V > 0                              
or substituting for A, and using D≥R in equilibrium,     
(16)                                                     (H-D)(F + S) – V > 0.                             
To ensure that the firms have no incentive to cheat after becoming the auditor’s client (and 
risking certain exposure by the auditor), we require: 
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(17)                                             [( )( ) ]  
1-
H D F S V DSL
H
δ
δ
− + −
> .                               
If V were 0,  the LHS would represent the present value of future honesty which we 
denote (for simplicity of notation) by Ph, so that (17) now reads 
1h
V DSLP
H
δ
δ− >− . 
This caps the fees that the auditor can get for an honest equilibrium to be 
sustainable with auditing.  The auditor’s fees however must not only be positive:  they 
must also suffice to deter collusion or extortion by him if he is to be credible. 
Collusion makes firm and auditor vulnerable to exposure by the public signal.  The 
firm takes this into account:  the maximum bribe it is willing to pay the auditor is its 
cheating gain less expected loss due to possible exposure plus expected saving in that 
event of future audit fees.  The auditor compares this bribe with his possible loss of future 
fees from all his N clients4 who will dismiss him, once exposure undermines shareholder 
confidence in him.  In the circumstances, the auditor may prefer to try to extract bribes, not 
from one, but from all his clients by offering to collude with all5.  Collusion offers must be 
made in advance of the action (so that firms can cheat if they so desire) – but implemented 
only at the end of the period by simultaneous exchange  of bribes for good reports.  
Suppose then that the auditor can make a secret offer to all his clients:  ‘If all of 
you bribe me,  I will certify that  none of you have cheated and you can then cheat with 
impunity’—the offer being made before the firms announced their payouts and the 
payment of each bribe synchronized with the delivery of a favorable report.  If this were 
possible, the auditor might be able to extract bribes from all his clients (rather than from 
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just one) and would stand to lose fees from all of them if caught.  Each client of course 
decides independently on the auditor’s offer.    
A crucial question here is what happens to q, the probability of collusion being 
detected, as the number of colluding firms increases.  Detection in a single case destroys 
the credibility of the auditor and his relationship with all his clients. Suppose the auditor’s 
probability of being caught is not perfectly correlated across firms:  q for the auditor is an 
increasing function of N, q(N), where N is the number of clients who decide to collude 
with him.  We defer for the moment the question of how N is determined.  An extreme 
example is a scenario in which the probability of not being caught while colluding with 
any one firm is independent of the probability of not being caught while colluding with any 
other.  In this event, we would have 
q(N) = 1 – {1 – q(1)}N. 
For the individual firm, however, the maximum bribe each firm will offer is equal 
to gains from cheating, minus expected loss if caught (the discounted value of future 
payoffs the entrepreneur could have got as an insider, less the fees he would have had to 
pay the auditor if both were still in business): the relevant level of public signal accuracy 
here is q(1), the signal that guides investors.  Thus the no collusion constraint is: 
( ) (1)(1)
1 1h
q N V DSL q Vq P
H
δ δ
δ δ> − +− −  
or 
(18)                                         [ ( ) (1)] (1)
1 h
q N q V DSL q P
H
δ
δ
−
> −
−
. 
In combination with the incentive constraint on firms to deter cheating, this gives us the 
following range of inequalities on auditor fees: 
 19
(19)                                     
(1)
1 ( ) (1)
h
h
DSL q PDSL V HP
H q N q
δ
δ
−
− > >
− −
. 
This range is non-empty if and only if 
(20)                                            ( ) [ ( ) 1 (1)]h
DSLq N P q N q
H
> + − .                                    
If q(N) = q(1), this last inequality implies that firms would have no incentive to cheat even 
without an auditor.  If, q(N) > q(1), firms might cheat in the absence of an auditor, but not 
under the eyes of one who receives a fee in the appropriate range. 
The implied upper limit on the ratio of outsider to insider capital is 
(21)                                      ( ) ( )
(1 )[1 ( ) (1)] ( ) ( )
m q N H H Ds
DL q N q q N H H D
δ
δ δ
−
=
− + − − −
.                         
Now 
(1) ( )**
(1 ) (1) ( )
m q H H Ds s
DL q H H D
δ
δ δ
−
> =
− − −
 
if and only if 
( )q N  [ (1 ) (1) ( )DL q H H Dδ δ− − − ] > (1)q [ (1 )[1 ( ) (1)] ( ) ( )DL q N q q N H H Dδ δ− + − − − ] 
or if and only if 
(22)                                           (1 (1))( ( ) (1))(1 ) 0q q N q DLδ− − − >                                        
Thus the auditor raises the limit on outsider financing compatible with honesty – and 
lowers the floor on wealth required to become an entrepreneur – provided the public signal 
is imperfect and his probability of being caught increases with the number of clients he 
attempts to collude with.  Likewise for the model with firm-specific assets. 
Not surprisingly, then, auditing has a larger role the noisier the public signal (the 
smaller is q(1)) – provided collusion can be prevented.  Control of collusion, on the other 
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hand, is facilitated by fees in the appropriate range, by a more accurate public signal and 
by greater patience on the firm’s part:  sm, the credible limit on the ratio of outsider to 
insider capital, is an increasing function of q(1) and q(N) and of δ. 
Turn now to the determination of N.  Firms decide independently on the collusion 
proposal and there is no guarantee of unanimity among them.  However, they differ only in 
size.  Moreover, all firms have an incentive to drive s to the common credibility limit 
determined by the market parameter D.  Thus, ultimately, firms differ only in the volume 
of entrepreneurial capital F and all differences in their behavior should be traceable to 
differences in F.  Now, every expression involving capital in all our behavioral inequalities 
is linear homogeneous in F and S – therefore in F (since the ratio of S to F is the same for 
all firms).  Accordingly, any proposal that makes auditing fees and bribes proportional to 
insider capital and is acceptable to one firm will be acceptable to all.  N will correspond to 
the entire clientele of the audit firm. 
 Another possibility is extortion by auditors. Auditors may attempt extortion from an 
honest but unlucky firm by threatening to falsely report that it had cheated.  However, the 
firm being blackmailed would recognize this as an empty threat.  It realizes that if it 
refuses to pay up, the auditor has no incentive to actually implement its threat:  while the 
auditor does not gain anything from lying about the firm (given the latter’s refusal to pay), 
he stands to lose his reputation – and therefore his future clientele – if his lying is exposed 
by the public signal.  Thus, in a perfect equilibrium extortion is ruled out. 
 We need not investigate the market structure of the auditing industry.  If audit fees 
are observable, they must lie within the range in (19):  outside it, there is no demand for 
auditing because auditing will not be credible.  Competition  no doubt affects auditing fees:  
 21
free entry into auditing, for example, reduces audit fees to the lower limit of the range – 
but not below it:  auditors prepared to work for less will not be believed by investors and 
will not therefore be employed (a la Shapiro-Stiglitz).  However, our results are not tied to 
any particular specification of the structure of the auditing industry.    
        
A comparison with the case of insider asset specificity  
In the model with firm-specific assets,  a similar analysis applies,  but now the 
condition for the firm not to cheat is: 
(23)                                            '( ) (1)(1)
1 1h
q N V DSL q Vq P
H
δ δ
δ δ> − +− −                                  
where 'hP  is the present value of future honesty in this particular model: 
'
hP  =  1h
DFP δ δ+ − . 
The critical range for credible auditing is then 
(24)                                               
'
'
(1)
1 ( ) (1)
h
h
DSL q PDSL V HP
H q N q
δ
δ
−
− > >
− −
.                                   
The upper limit to the ratio of outsider to insider capital becomes 
(25)                          
2
1 ( )
(1 )[1 ( ) (1)] ( ) ( )
m q N Hs
DL q N q q N H H D
δ
δ δ= − + − − −  
> 
2(1) *
(1 ) (1) ( )
q H s
DL q H H D
δ
δ δ =− − − .                                      
Thus again, the credibility constraint is relaxed and the floor on wealth required to 
become an entrepreneur is lowered.   
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Are auditors happier when insiders’ assets are firm-specific and are lost when the 
firm is dissolved – i.e. in model 1 than in model 2?  We might think so because the cap on 
auditor fees for a credible honest equilibrium has increased : however, at the same time the 
lower limit has fallen.  Moreover, given D and s, the critical q*(D) (implied by (2)) is 
lower than q**(D)   in (14).   Given D and s, there is a smaller range of q in model 1,  for 
which auditors’ services are in demand.6   
Discussion 
In both models above, auditing relaxes the credibility constraint and lowers the 
floor on wealth required to become an insider.  This raises both the supply and demand 
curves for capital with the following consequences for the different equilibria specified. 
First, the change in the interior equilibrium will replicate the same ratio of outsider 
to entrepreneurial capital s*(determined by the wealth distribution independently of all 
other factors) but at a higher payoff D for investors.  Entry requirements (determined by 
s*) are invariant, so is the set of firms.  Since all available capital was fully invested in the 
industry and remains so after the change, there is no impact on output, only a redistribution 
from firms to investors and auditors. 
Second, if equilibrium without auditing lay on the flat segment of the demand 
curve, so will equilibrium with auditing, but with more firms and entrepreneurial 
investment just compensating for lower outsider investment (so that all capital continues to 
be employed in the industry).  Auditing relaxes entry requirements, but capitalists remain 
indifferent between entering and not entering.  Everyone continues to earn H – so there is 
neither a redistributive nor an output effect. 
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Third, if equilibrium occurred earlier on the flat segment of the supply curve,  the 
rise in both curves will absorb some of the excess supply of capital into the industry (at the 
same payoff R) or all of it (at a higher payoff).  In the former case, higher s* will result in 
lower entry requirements, more firms, and increased mobilization of outside capital 
without change in its payoff.  Outside investors will be no worse than before, while firms 
benefit – incumbents from a higher s, new entrants from a rise in payoff above the 
opportunity cost level R.  The Pareto improvement is possible because excess capital 
earlier reduced to its outside option is now in the industry, increasing its output by more 
than its displaced earnings.  In the latter case, there is a shift to a regular interior 
equilibrium.  s* rises, leading to new entry and more outside investment in each firm at a 
higher payoff D > R.  Outside investors and new firms benefit; whether incumbents benefit 
or not depends on whether higher s compensates for the higher payout D.  In any event, 
industry output increases.  So the gains of the gainers will more than offset the losses of 
the losers, and the changed scenario is optimal according to the Hicks-Kaldor-Scitovsky 
compensation criteria. 
Finally, where no market exists, the change could create one if it raises s*(R) above 
(I/Wmax) – 1, increasing credibility to the point where a firm can offer investors their 
opportunity cost.  The Pareto-improvement is clear; so is its source – the emergence of the 
market. 
From this we can gather the following.  It seems that in case 2 – where equilibrium 
without auditing lies on the flat segment of the demand curve (only possible with firm-
specific assets) –  auditing has no role as it has neither an output nor a redistributive effect.  
In case 4 –  where Pareto gains are to be achieved – there are clear gains to hiring an 
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auditor, and this happens, as we discussed before, when no one in the society has very 
much wealth.  In situation 3,  too an auditor adds to net social welfare.  Situation 3 – that of 
excess supply of capital – is likely to arise when there is a strong middle class so that the 
fraction of wealth owned by those with less wealth than F* or F** is substantial.  Because 
a high enough proportion of total wealth is owned by those not qualified to become 
insiders, an excess supply of capital emerges.  Thus another situation when auditing is 
beneficial is when there is a strong middle class.  Here, we do not concern ourselves with 
how auditing emerges in the first place7.   Finally, in situation 1, firms do not gain from 
auditing.  Investors, however, do.  In this situation, we could perhaps see intermediaries 
hired by investors instead of firm-hired auditors.  This suggests that a firm-hired auditor is 
important either when every one in the society is strongly wealth constrained,  or when 
there is a prominent middle class.    
What policy conclusions can we draw from our analysis? We see that an honest 
equilibrium with auditing requires audit fees in a range definable in terms of the 
parameters (high enough to deter collusion, and low enough to deter cheating by the 
auditor’s clients).  Now mandatory disclosure of audit fees can guarantee an honest 
equilibrium (provided that the required range is non-empty) because investors can satisfy 
themselves that auditors’ fees indeed lie in this range.  Therefore, mandatory disclosure 
could ensure an honest equilibrium with the welfare gains alluded to above. Such 
disclosure would, of course, have to be backed by penalties severe enough to eliminate any 
net expected positive payoff to cheating based on false disclosure (after taking into account 
the consequences of possible exposure by the public signal).    
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Auditors dislike any rise in public transparency for two reasons.  First, lower q 
increases the probability that auditors can significantly improve welfare over the public 
signal and so increases demand for them. Secondly, audit fees that guarantee an honest 
equilibrium are lower for an accurate public signal (particularly if accuracy increases 
speedily with the number of clients).  The logic is that if the signal is inaccurate, auditors’ 
future fees should be high for the expected loss of such fees (should collusion be exposed) 
to outweigh the current period bribes the auditor could extract.  Auditors therefore would 
dislike changes such as disclosure of stock options as costs.8 
In the light of our model, we now briefly discuss some suggested antidotes to 
corporate fraud such as the reforms partly embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   One such 
measure is the separation of audit from non-audit activities.   The idea is that this would 
limit the scope for bribery(otherwise, a generous investment banking mandate, for 
example,  could secure the auditor-cum-investment banker’s collusion).   Certainly, a 
legally enforced separation of audit from non-audit activities could increase the credibility 
of auditing by making covert bribery difficult and facilitating detection. In terms of our 
model,  it would raise q, resulting in a wider range of fees satisfying the conditions for 
honest auditing.  
An additional conclusion is that the inaccessibility of outside credit for 
entrepreneurs may significantly restrict market creation, particularly when credit market 
imperfection is compounded by a wealth distribution with too few wealthy individuals   
However, auditing can partially compensate for this market imperfection.  Auditors, on the 
other hand, dislike a too-perfect credit market that enables firms to set up business for 
lower values of public transparency and thus minimizes the need for auditors. 
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7.  Optimal contracts. 
Equity contracts of course are only one of the possible ways of raising capital.  
Consider an alternative scenario in which the firm has a menu of contracts to choose from.  
In Model I, the most general form of contract that our liquidity-constrained firm can offer 
its investors is the promise to deliver min [DGS, G(F + S)] if it is lucky and min[DBS, B(F 
+ S)] if unlucky (where pDG + (1 – p)DB = D).  This is a contract that explicitly allows for 
the possibility of bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy is possible if DBS > B(F + S).  On the other 
hand, if DBS ≤ B(F + S) – implying s ≤ sl = 
B
B
D B−
 –  bankruptcies are impossible and any 
claim of bankruptcy will be legally barred.   
The possibility of bankruptcy raises the specter of false bankruptcies.  The 
entrepreneur could claim misfortune even when he has been lucky, distribute B(F + S) < 
DBS to his investors and decamp with the spoils (DG – B)S – BF.  (Bankruptcy implies  
closure of the firm and loss of its subsequent income:  so false bankruptcies are 
unprofitable if the present value of this loss exceeds its one-time cheating gain – if 
[ ( ) ] ( )
1 G
HF H D S D B S BFδ δ
+ − ≥ − −
−
 
or s ≤ (1 )
(1 )( ) ( )G
H B
D B H D
δ δ
δ δ
+ −
− − − −
 = sb. 
Of course, this implies a meaningful limit on s only if sb > 0, which occurs if and only if 
 (1 – δ)(DG – B) > δ(H – D). 
 If s ≤ sb or if DBS ≤ B(F + S), there will be no false bankruptcies.  However,  
firms could still cheat by misrepresenting the fortunes of the business and offering 
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investors DBS instead of their rightful dues DGS, risking detection by the public signal 
and loss of future income.  This variety of cheating would be unprofitable if and only if 
[ ( ) ] ( )
1 G B
q HF H D S D D Sδ δ
+ − ≥ −
−
 
or s ≤ 
(1 )( ) ( )G B
qH
D D q H D
δ
δ δ− − − −  = sd. 
 
An optimal contract is one that maximizes s while eliminating false bankruptcies 
as well as the incentive to dishonestly offer investors DBS instead of DGS.  Bankruptcy 
would be impossible if the contract itself provides that, in the event of bad luck, the entire 
proceeds of the firm should go to the outside investor: DBS = B(F + S).  This is indeed 
the maximum guarantee against misfortune that a liquidity-constrained firm can credibly 
promise the outside investor:  it maximizes DB subject to credibility. If  max DB = B(F + 
S)/S ≤ D ≤ DG, the implication is that it minimizes the cheating premium (DG – DB) for 
any given D – and thereby maximizes sd.  It follows that this is the optimal contract 
whenever  B(F + S)/S ≤ D.  Given that investors are to receive B(F + S) under bad luck, 
the contract must provide for a good luck payout that ensures an expected return D: 
pDGS + (1 – p)B(F + S) = DS 
or DGS = [DS – (1 – p)B(F + S)]/p. 
With DG and DB thus determined, (DG – DB)S reduces to {DS – B(F + S)}/p, yielding 
s ≤ ŝ = (1 )
(1 )( ) ( )
pqH B
D B pq H B
δ δ
δ δ
+ −
− − − −
. 
Thus, the optimal contract also imposes a ceiling on s that is a decreasing function of D. 
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 The picture is rather different if B(F + S)/S > D.  With a contract that offers 
investors B(F + S) in the event of bad luck, this configuration tempts the firm to cheat the 
investor in the diametrically opposite way – by offering the smaller good luck payoff 
when in fact it has been unlucky.  However, B(F + S)/S > D is equivalent to s < B
D B−
,  
s is a variable controlled by the firm and the firm’s profits are an increasing function of s 
(if D < H).9 Since, s < B
D B−
 also undermines its credibility by creating moral hazard, 
the firm has every incentive to increase s to the level s ≥ B
D B−
, at which point the firm 
will find it worthwhile to offer the optimal contract described above. 
 The credibility limit for the pure equity contract is s = s*.  That for a pure debt 
contract is determined by the no-bankruptcy conditions – either s ≤ sl or s ≤ sb, which 
reduce, for this contract (in which DB=DG=D), to s ≤ 
B
D B−
 and s ≤ 
(1 )
(1 ) ( )
H B
D B H B
δ δ
δ δ
+ −
− − − −
 respectively.  All these limits are lower than ŝ, the ceiling on the 
ratio of outsider to insider finance under an optimal contract.  In all cases, however, there 
is a limit to the size of the firm, proportional to the personal wealth of the entrepreneur.  
All our qualitative results will therefore continue to hold. 
8.  Extensions 
Our model suggests that the ratio of outsider to insider capital influences insiders’ 
temptation to cheat but that auditing mitigates this effect, making a higher ratio consistent 
with honesty.  This has interesting implications for international differences in 
shareholding patterns.  In the US, for example, most firms are widely held: s is higher than 
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in countries dominated by family-owned firms or those where large blocks of capital are 
owned by other large companies, or banks – well represented on the board of directors and 
therefore “insiders”.  Does this difference reflect differences in the auditing framework? Is 
firm ownership dispersed where better auditing safeguards small outside shareholders?  
We find much empirical support for this view. La Porta et al, [1999], find that firms are 
widely held only in countries which have good measures of shareholder protection. In 
other countries, one often observes family owned firms.  This fits in with family financing 
and underdeveloped share markets wherever shareholder protection (eg. a better auditing 
framework or better transparency) is inadequate.  La Porta et al [1997] also find that firms 
tend to go public in the first place only if good measures of shareholder protection are in 
place.  Evidence from Korea (Joh [2003]) indicates that in a large sample of externally 
audited firms, misappropriation by controlling insiders was severe wherever these insiders 
had a low ownership stake. This bears out our result that a high ratio of outsider financing 
intensifies moral hazard.  
Of course, a widely held shareholding pattern also implies that when auditing is 
faulty, there is a great danger of investors being duped.  In our model shareholders are 
aware of the aggregate ratio of outsider to insider capital and can make their investment 
decision accordingly. However if this information could be kept secret – for example if 
insiders secretly divest (as in Enron), raising the ratio of outsider to insider financing – 
outside shareholders become more vulnerable. 
9.  Related Literature 
 Our paper is related to many strands of the theoretical and empirical literature.  It 
contributes to a body of work on “order without law” – though there may be a legal 
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mechanism in the background its role is limited where non-verifiability leads to incomplete 
contracting.   Given this framework we inquire into the possibility of sustaining “order” – 
here,  honest behavior by firms – in a repeated game with imperfect public information.  
We also examine how and when private intermediation in the form of informed auditing 
could help.  Dixit [2003] is quite closely related to our work.   But while Dixit considers 
random one-period encounters between anonymous buyers and sellers, who may each be 
intrinsically honest or opportunistic, our relationships are more persistent, terminated only 
by the detection of cheating.  Further, no one is intrinsically honest, but only firms have an 
incentive to cheat, so that ours is a one-sided prisoner’s dilemma.  Also, while Dixit’s 
outcomes are determinate, ours are stochastic:  so, despite perfect observability of payoffs 
not just by the cheated investor but by the general public, not even the cheated party can 
tell for sure if it has really been cheated.  In Dixit’s model, any one who is cheated knows 
this when he observes his payoffs – the problem is how to convey the information to the 
cheat’s potential future partners.    
 Other cheating literature relevant to our analysis includes Greif's theoretical models 
and case studies of the multilateral punishment of cheats by Maghribi trader-coalitions and 
the contrast with bilateral punishments.  The public signal as well as private intermediation 
facilitate multilateral punishment of cheating firms by all investors (not just the ones 
cheated) and multilateral punishment for a deviant auditor. 
Another strand of the literature our paper relates to is work on imperfect markets 
for capital or credit.  For example, in Banerjee and Newman [1993], the initial wealth 
distribution in the population determines occupational choice - only those whose wealth 
exceeds a certain floor can become entrepreneurs.  The underlying causes are imperfect 
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capital markets (as entrepreneurs may renege on loans) and a minimum size requirement 
for making the enterprise operational.  In our paper we combine ideas of indivisibilities in 
enterprise size and imperfect capital markets with the moral hazard that entrepreneurs 
(insiders in our model) face with regard to their outside shareholders.   
Our paper also relates to some corporate finance literature.  In Gale and Hellwig 
[1985], firms have the potential of cheating their investors because the state of nature is 
costlessly observable only by the firm.  In that paper, investors (often big entities like 
banks) can verify the state of nature, but verification is costly.  The paper recommends a 
debt contract (which being state-invariant, leaves the firm with less scope for cheating by 
exploiting its private knowledge of the state) with the proviso that declarations of 
bankruptcy should be followed by costly state verification by the lender.  Beyond one 
period, however, problems of renegotiation-proofness arise.  While we focus on equity 
contracts, in principle a very similar analysis is applicable to a debt contract as well.  In 
that event, firms could exploit their asymmetric information about the state of nature to 
declare bankruptcy and give the investors a cash flow consistent with bad luck.  However, 
the same firms could, unless caught by the public signal, again be refinanced by investors 
who believe that the firm genuinely experienced bad luck.  If the public signal is 
sufficiently imprecise, investors know beforehand that the firms face too strong a moral 
hazard, and do not finance the industry. 
We now come to the empirical literature.   Some of this supports (a) our result that 
a high ratio of outsider to insider financing intensifies moral hazard (Joh, [2003], Lemmon 
and Lins, [2003]); (b) our prediction that firms would be widely held only in countries with 
better shareholder protection in the form of external auditing or a transparent public 
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environment (La Porta et al [1999], Shleifer and Wolfenzon [2002]), and (c) our 
implication that investor protection (like auditing), by making it possible to credibly raise 
share-capital, determines whether firms go public or remain family enterprises (La Porta et 
al [1997]). Studies of the effect of the provision of non audit services on auditing firms' 
tendency to qualify a report are also relevant (Wines [1994], Barkess and Simnett [1994], 
Craswell, Stokes and Laughton [2002]).  
 
 
  
                                                                                         
Appendices 
 
The Zero Savings Assumption 
Somewhat extreme assumptions with regard to savings are in fact common in the 
literature where they serve a variety of purposes.  For example, Galor and Zeira, [1993], 
assume – without any attempt at justification – that the young generation in a two-period 
overlapping- generations model doesn’t consume at all;  Bernanke and Gertler, [1989], 
assume that one class of agents, in another overlapping generations model, consumes only 
after retirement.  A certain degree of licence has been traditionally permitted in the 
literature with regard to the savings assumption. 
This is not to say that no justification can be offered for the no-savings assumption 
in our model.  One possible justification is as follows.  In models like ours, risk-neutrality 
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is a standard postulate.  With a constant rate of time-preference, the intertemporal utility 
function can then be written as 
U = ∑δtct 
where ct is consumption in the t-th period.  The net gain in utility from a one-period 
postponement of a unit of t-th period consumption is then 
δt[– 1 +  δ(1 + rt)] 
where rt is the rate of return to capital in the t-th period.  With risk-neutrality, savings are 
no longer needed to perform a consumption-smoothing function.  They now reflect only 
the discrepancy, if any, between the rate of time-preference and the rate of return on 
capital.  When these are independent of the level of consumption, savings will have a 
bang-bang character.  If there are no constraints on the consumption of capital and time 
preference exceeds the rate of return, all wealth will be dissipated in the first period.  On 
the other hand, if the rate of return is higher, all income will be saved and consumption 
postponed for ever.  Savings will be precisely zero if (1) capital is not consumable (again a 
standard assumption, see Bernanke and Gertler, [1989]) and (2) time preference is higher 
than the rate of return.10  In our model, the highest rate of return is H:  a sufficient 
condition for zero savings therefore is H < (1 – δ)/δ.  It can be readily checked that such a 
restriction is not inconsistent with any of our results. 
One could of course question the origin of what wealth there is.  Where did it come 
from if there are no savings?  Here, we must resort to ‘manna from heaven’ assumptions.  
All wealth could be land, as in some banana republic where the consumption good is too 
perishable to be stored.  Alternatively, in an industrial economy, wealth could be 
machinery, that the country has received through foreign aid or as war reparations.  Our 
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essential purpose of course is a focus on the problem of cheating independently of the level 
or distribution of wealth;  and all we need for this purpose is that the zero-savings 
assumption should be self-consistent, not that it should be realistic. 
The Optimality of Multiple Collusions 
An auditor who makes an offer of collusion to a single client can extract a maximum 
bribe amounting to his client’s maximum gain from cheating 
X = (1)(1)
1h
DSL q Vq P
H
δ
δ− + −  
But his expected income is less than X by the expected value of the fees paid by all of his 
clients that would be lost in the event of exposure  - which is (1)
1
q N Vδ
δ− .  Denote this by 
q(1)Y where Y is the discounted value of audit fees from all N clients.   If, however, the 
auditor were to offer to collude with all his clients, and this offer is accepted by all, his 
potential income from bribes would be multiplied by N, while the risk of exposure would 
increase from q(1) to q(N).  (We have proved in the text that an offer acceptable to one 
client is acceptable to all).  His income expectation from multiple collusion is  
NX –  q(N)Y 
His income from single collusion is 
X-q(1)Y. 
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for him to prefer multiple collusion is  
Nq(1) ≥ q(N). 
This condition is sufficient because if it holds, multiple collusion yields more profits for 
the auditor than N times the profits from single collusion (and N cannot be less than one).  
An interpretation of the sufficient condition is that the risk of exposure should not increase 
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more than additively as the number of firms increases.  While this seems highly plausible, 
multiple collusion can be optimal even under weaker conditions. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1. However, investors will take care that their investment in the firm is not so much that it tempts 
cheating.   
 
2. Empirical work links the extent to which firms go public, as opposed to operating primarily as 
family-owned firms, to the extent of shareholder protection available.  This becomes relevant to our work 
as we show later that credible external auditing can create a market and facilitate raising capital in the share 
market.   
 
3. Lal and Myint [1996] provide a good discussion of this. 
 
4. We do not of course assume that there is only one auditor to the industry:  N is simply the number 
of firms hiring a particular auditor, not the total number in the industry 
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5. We show in the appendix that this is generally the optimal course for an auditor who proposes to 
collude.   
 
6. The intuition for this is as follows. Firms stand to lose more in the event of dishonesty in model 1, 
provided they are caught by the public signal.  Therefore, they are honest for a greater range of public signal 
accuracy.    
 
7. This could be the subject of another paper. 
 
8. This conclusion might be modified if we assumed that auditors can detect cheating only 
inaccurately.  In that case, they might be helped by higher q, with the public signal complementing their 
efforts.  But the effects mentioned above would still be present.  
 
9. D > H is incompatible with the existence of the firm since the entrepreneur would then prefer to 
become an outside investor. 
 
10. No individual can dissave by trading capital for output, since, if one wishes to dissave, so will 
everyone else – so that the potential dissaver cannot find anyone to trade with. 
